Given the limited capabilities on R&D and global distribution channels, and the virtual non-existence of patented drugs, the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry has little chance to enter the global market of Western prescription drugs and compete with the established global giants head-on. The reality is that they are chasing a moving target and their competitors are becoming bigger and stronger day by day. The substantial reduction of import tariffs and the granting of comprehensive trading and distribution rights to foreign-financed firms after the WTO accession, effectively tilted the level-playing field against the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry. Given the short-term competitive advantages of Chinese pharmaceuticals industry on Chinese drugs, three development strategies are suggested: (1) consolidate local market of herbal and generic drugs, (2) market Chinese drugs via the Internet, and (3) outsource R&D and collaborative marketing.
Introduction
The pharmaceuticals industry underwent massive consolidation in the 1990s due to a combination of three factors. First, the cost of discovering and developing new drugs is increasing exponentially due to the high cost of equipment and highly skilled scientists demanded by genetic research, and the expensive human clinical trials needed in order to satisfy regulatory authorities.
Second, the global reach of sales and marketing channels is increasingly important in order to gain and to maintain a market share. 1 Third, the booming stock market and the shareholders' pressure to sustain the high profit margin drove the sector to develop 'blockbuster drugs' (those that can earn US$1 billion or more), something only the largest ones can afford to do. Therefore, a bigger pharmaceutical company with teams of research and development (R&D) and global sales forces in different therapeutic categories has the competitive advantage over their competitors. This explains the unprecedented mergers and acquisitions (M&As) frenzy in the 1990s, which involved approx three dozen drug companies (including about half of the top 25 drugs companies). The value of pharmaceutical mergers reached US$290 billion between 1995 and 1999, including the formation of AstraZeneca and Aventis. 2 As the threshold of critical mass to conduct research on a broad scale and to have global development and distribution capabilities is changing overtime, further market consolidation may reduce the number of major pharmaceutical companies from 35 to less than 12 over the next decade. 3 1 Permission to advertise prescription drugs on television in the US since 1997 has increased the marketing costs tremendously. Since the US is the only developed country with no price control on prescription drugs and allows direct advertisement, all major drug companies are targeting this higher value-added market (the US market have skyrocketed from US$38 billion in 1990 to US$100 billion in 1998). In the US, it is estimated that it costs up to US$1 billion plus a 1,000 strong sales-force to market a new drug in its first two years. Subsequently, drug companies spent US$1.9 billion on direct-to-consumer advertising in 1999; see Financial Times, (8 November 1999), p. 21 and (23 November 1999) 105-141. Created in 1995, the WTO is an inter-governmental body comprising the majority of the world's countries. Based on the spirit of classical liberalism and the rule of law, the purpose of WTO is to promote multi-lateral trade through reduction in obstacles erected by individual countries to global trade in goods and services, settle trade disputes and lay down rules governing international trade. Although decisions are normally arrived at through consensus of all members, WTO actions are based on non-discrimination and equal treatment of member countries. The WTO accession for China demanded a number of areas for liberalisation ranging from tariffs reduction to quotas elimination. In return, the US government granted the Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR, formally called the Most Favoured Nation or MFN) status to China, which levies the same level of tariffs on Chinese and other US's major trading partners imports, effectively on 1 January 2002. The will also ended the application of the US's Jackson-Vanik amendment, which requires communist countries to show they do not restrict emigration before they can be granted the normal Wang and Yeung investigate the competitiveness of a particular pharmaceutical firm, Sanjiu Group. 7 They all provide useful information and analysis but none of them analyse the effects of WTO accession on the pharmaceuticals industry.
Chen, and Yu, Zheng and Song did cover pharmaceuticals in their studies on the impacts of WTO accession but neither of them is comprehensive. 8
To fill in the literature gap, this paper investigates the implications of WTO accession on the pharmaceuticals industry in China. This paper focuses on the differences of production and R&D capabilities between the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry and the global giants as well as the development strategy for the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry. While the actual effects of the WTO accession on the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry is still uncertain, the preliminary assessment based on existing information can still shed light on the level of competition that the Chinese drug companies will encountered in the near future. This has tremendous implications on the direction of future policy implemented by the State Drug Administration (SDA) in China. For instance, should the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry maintaining their 'to conquer the world strategy'? How long can the competitive advantages of Chinese pharmaceuticals industry on herbal medicine over their global giant's counterparts sustained? What development strategy should the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry pursue after the WTO accession? It must be emphasised that the focus of this paper is on pharmaceuticals (generic and patented drugs). Other consumer healthcare products that are included in the product portfolios of pharmaceutical companies (e.g. Johnson & Johnson) will not be analysed.
The background and the possible impacts of the WTO accession on the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry will be presented and assessed in sections 2-3.
Before concluding the major findings of this paper in section 5, three development strategies for the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry will be outlined in section 4.
Background of the Chinese Pharmaceuticals Industry
China is an important pharmaceuticals market. At US$13.24 billion in 2000, the total value of pharmaceutical sales accounted for about one-third of the East Asian market outside Japan. 9 It was the same size as the combined markets of Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia, and was more than double that of India. 10 From the early 1980s to the mid-1990s, output of both Western and traditional Chinese medicines increased more than fourfold. 11
Despite the fast growth of output and consumption, per capita pharmaceuticals consumption in China was still small in international terms. In 1995, it was less than US$3/person, compared to US$132/person in the UK, US$334/person in the US and US$488/person in Japan. 12 It was also much smaller than in neighbouring East Asian developing countries, where the comparable figures were US$13/person in Malaysia, US$16/person in the Philippines, US$47/person in Hong Kong and US$75/person in Taiwan. 13 It is expected that the Chinese market will grow from the world's ninth largest to one of the largest in the world. Not only will demand rise due to increases in incomes, but also China is likely to have a rapidly ageing population in the next century, which will tend to boost demand for pharmaceuticals even further. 
Domestic liberalisation
China's pharmaceutical industry was under tight state control before the government allow competition to develop among suppliers since the mid-1980s.
As controls were relaxed, the industry was able to earn relatively high profits.
However, even in the late 1990s, China's large, old-established state plants remained quite tightly controlled by the government, with production and sales 'tasks' for its main products. These plants mainly produce relatively capitalintensive upstream intermediate pharmaceuticals, especially off-patent antibiotics, which are then processed by smaller factories, as well as producing generic, lowmargin final products, e.g. penicillin and aspirin. Many of these were on a downward spiral, with obsolete equipment, poor research facilities and a high debt-asset ratio. By contrast, manufacturers of traditional Chinese medicines and foreign-funded enterprises enjoyed much greater freedom to set prices.
Despite formal liberalisation, the de facto intervention in the market remained as a large fraction of pharmaceuticals are prescribed by hospitals, mostly run by the state. These are gradually moving towards financial autonomy. The proportion of healthcare costs, including medicines, that must be financed by the individuals employed in state institutions is rising, providing an incentive to source drugs from the lowest-cost source. In fact, the central government recently issued formal directives and informal instructions to hospitals and healthcare centres to buy local products. To combat the over-supply and its financial impact in the domestic pharmaceuticals industry, the Beijing government banned the imports of ten drugs, including Vitamin C and penicillin, in 1999. 15 To reduce the widespread over-prescription abuses that drove up pharmaceutical spending to more than 60% of total health care costs, the government introduced a multifaceted price control system on imported drugs and those manufactured by Sinoforeign joint ventures (JVs). 16 The price ceiling would be fixed after the authority compared the quality and price of the import drug with the generic versions manufactured by domestic or other developing countries pharmaceuticals firms. 15 South China Morning Post, (6 February 1999) . 16 The new system is introduced to replace the price capping system in place since 1996; see In 1998, the third largest Chinese drug company had a turnover of 3 billion yuan, profits of 300 million yuan, total assets of 4.1 billion yuan and 20,000 of employees. 20
International liberalisation
Foreign investment in the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry was permitted from early on in the reform process. By the mid-1990s, following the gradual liberalisation of the domestic industry, investment had increased to significant levels. By 1999, there was a total of about 1,800 pharmaceutical JVs. as Xian Jannsen and Tianjin SmithKline, were able to generate much greater total profits than their leading indigenous competitors, and dramatically higher ratios of profits to sales and assets, e.g. Tianjin SmithKline recorded a profits-sales ratio of 63%, which was at least 20% higher than the other nine top pharmaceutical corporations in China in 1997 (Table 1) . 21 South China Morning Post, (9 January 1999 and 15 April 1999) . It is estimated that there are 120 million hepatitis B carriers in China and 10% of them may develop chronic hepatitis B. The wholly foreign-owned Suzhou plant also used to manufacture antibiotics currently made in the UK and sold in China. The plant can be used by Glaxo-Wellcome to side-step the "buy local" directives; see Financial Times, (15 July 1999), p. IV. 22 China Daily: Business Weekly, (14 December 1997).
Industrial structure
Under the command economy, the largest pharmaceutical manufacturers were the traditional state producers of Western medicines, mainly antibiotics. The largest of these were the Huabei plant at Shijiazhuang and the Dongbei plant in Shenyang, with over 7,000 employees each.
In the emerging market economy, entities with the characteristics of a genuine 'firm' began to take shape. The relatively large profits obtained in the sector led to a wave of new plants being established across the country. In 1987, there were over 2,600 enterprises producing medical and pharmaceutical products, with almost 700,000 employees. 23 By 1997, the number of pharmaceutical enterprises in China had risen to 3,411, an extraordinarily large number for a market of China's size. 24 There were almost 3,000 tiny labour-intensive, handicraft enterprises, producing a single product under primitive conditions, without benefit from economies of sale or scope. These accounted for about 80% of the total number of enterprises in the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry, but for only 15% of the industry's total output value. 25 Indeed, in 1997, each of the enterprise size groups of below 30 million yuan (roughly US$3.7 million) per annum made losses (Table 2) .
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
The vast bulk of the industry's profits were generated by the largest enterprises, which increasingly benefited from economies of scale and scope, with better technology and quality control, more modern management systems, brand names and growing marketing systems. In 1997, enterprises with annual sales of over 100 million yuan (around US$12 million) accounted for around one-half of the pharmaceutical industry's fixed assets, two-thirds of its sales value and the sectors' value-added (Table 2) . However, within the largest size group of pharmaceutical firms, the firm-level concentration was still low. In 1997, the top 23 State Statistical Bureau, Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1988, p. 298. 24 In 1998, there were 6,391 drug companies (including 1,790 JVs) in China, with a total production value of 163 billion yuan. The industrial profits on sales averaged 5.91% and the industrial profit-assets ratio was 5.52% (down from 20.38% in 1991); see South China Morning Post, (1 November 1999). ten and twenty firms had a total market share of just 16% and 22%, respectively (Table 1 ). In the international market, the corresponding market shares of the top ten and twenty firms were 36% (pro-forma 43% in 1998) and 56%, respectively. 26 Sales and profits of the leading firms were tiny compared to the global industry. In 
The WTO Accession: David Vs Goliath?
According to the WTO accord signed in November 2001, the major areas of liberalisation relating to the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry are as follows: 30
• Import tariffs will be reduced by about 60%, from an average of 9.6% to 4.2%, before 1 January 2003.
• Chinese quotas and other quantitative restrictions will grow from the current trade level at 15% per annum and to be phase-out no later than 2005. 25 • China will provide comprehensive trading (import and export) and distribution (wholesaling, retailing, transportation, etc., including the provision of services and the goods made in China) rights to foreign-financed firms for the first time. Trading and distribution rights will be phased in progressively over three years.
• China will eliminate and cease enforcing contractual requirements on trade and foreign exchange balancing, and local contents upon the WTO accession. To answer the above questions, the competitive advantages of Chinese pharmaceuticals industry is analysed from two benchmarks: (1) R&D capability and product portfolio, and (2) production capability and market share.
R&D capability & product portfolio
As one of the 'strategic industries', China's goal is to be 'one of the world's pharmaceutical giants by the middle of the next century'. 31 To achieve this aim, China recognises that it must develop its own R&D capabilities in order to produce patent drugs to compete in the international market. The central government promised that it would support R&D in the sector through research conducted at the China Administrative Centre for New Drug Research and Development, under the SDA.
In terms of R&D capability, the Chinese pharmaceutical firms are not only miles behind the global giants, but also well behind their Japanese counterparts, who are using herbal ingredients in their products. Between 1985 and 1998, only 62 out of 1,500 new medicines developed in China met international standards and merely two were original products with a unique chemical structure. 32 Moreover, not a single Chinese chemical drug had achieved an international patent. For chemical drugs, the fact is that the R&D budget of a mediocre Japanese company is higher than that for the whole Chinese pharmaceuticals industry. For instance, the whole Chinese pharmaceuticals industry spent one billion yuan (about US$121 million) on R&D in 1998, which is even lower than the US$134 million spent by Ono Pharmaceutical (Japan), which ranked 74 th in the international R&D league. 33 The R&D expenditure of the entire Chinese pharmaceuticals industry is about 3.4% of the US$3.59 billion spent by Aventis and 4.8% of the US$2.5 billion spent by Merck (the top R&D spender before the formation of Glaxo-SmithKline and Pfizer in 2000-2001) . With an average R&D intensity (ratio of R&D expenditure to the sales value) of less than 1%, the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry also spend much less proportionally than the 31 China Daily: Business Weekly, (14 December 1997) . 32 Financial Times, (15 July 1999), p. IV; South China Morning Post, (1 November 1999) . 33 It must be emphasised that the inter-country comparison of R&D capability is suffered from the drawbacks of fluctuation on currency exchange rate and the differences on real costs (productivity) global giants. In a stark contrast, the global giants spend an average 10-19% of its revenues on R&D. 34 The R&D gap between the global giants and the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry can be further illustrated by the comparison of the R&D expenditure of the former and the sale value of the latter. In 1997, the total sale value of the entire Chinese pharmaceuticals industry was about US$14.1 billion, which is even lower than the US$16.57 billion spent by the top 10 global giants on R&D (Table 3 ). In fact, the total sale value of Chinese pharmaceuticals industry accounted for only about 26% of the total R&D expenditure spent by the major Western pharmaceutical corporations. In the late 1990s, the discovering and development costs of a new drug is estimated to be about US$500-600 million and the estimated minimum level of R&D investment necessary for a global drug company to remain competitive ranges between US$1.5-2 billion per annum. 35 As a result of focusing their huge R&D budgets on a few selected areas, the emerging patterns of sectoral global dominance is clearly illustrated by the therapeutic market share of the global giants. In terms of market share, Glaxo-SmithKline ranked first in three therapeutic categories (anti-infective, respiratory, and antibiotics and vaccines) and second in another two therapeutic categories (central nervous system, and alimentary and metabolic) in 1998. 36 Moreover, it is a world leader in automated combinatorial chemistry, genomics, bioinformatics and DNA microchips. AstraZeneca is a world leader in gastro-intestinal (including ulcers), cardiovascular, cancer and oncology. 37 Obviously, the gap in R&D capabilities of R&D scientists. Given the lack of alternative benchmark, however, the R&D expenditure is used as the 'second best' indicator to illustrate the R&D capability. 34 37 Despite the fact that the R&D expenditure has quadrupled in real terms during the last two decades, the number of innovative new products surviving the toxicology testing and clinical trials has actually decreased from 60 per annum in the mid-1980s to about 4 per annum. A top-tier pharmaceutical company is only able to introduce a new drug once every 27 months on average. Andersen Consulting estimates that, in order to sustain the average 10% growth per annum in the industry, the top ten pharmaceutical companies will each have to launch five important new drugs a year with annual sales of US$350 million for each product. However, none of them has such a strong pipeline. The ten leading companies were each able to launch an average of only 0.45 new drugs per annum between 1990 and 1994 and only 8% of those new products had sales value of US$350 million. Moreover, the patents of 100 medicines, with annual sales of US$35 billion, will between the global giants and the Chinese counterparts is simple insurmountable in the near future.
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
As the R&D expenditure of the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry accounts for only about 20% of the discovering and developing costs of a new drug in the West, it is no longer surprising that not a single Chinese chemical drug has obtained an international patient. The lack of R&D capability in the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry also partly explains why the parallel imports, localisation The R&D in the pharmaceuticals industry is a long-term and risky investment. The restriction of government subsidies on SOEs and SIEs after the WTO accession will certainly limit the channels of funding for the pharmaceuticals industry. As they are subjected to hard-budget constraints, the R&D budgets must be sourced from internal capital. Worse still, the Chinese banking sector is not keen to provide credit for R&D. Without the capital to conduct R&D on Western drugs, the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry is likely to be confined in the vicious circle of low value-added generic drug production and low profit-margin businesses.
Production capability & market share
The Chinese pharmaceuticals industry is well behind the global giants in production capability, especially in high value-added drugs and quality control. In terms of production value, the largest Chinese pharmaceutical firm, Huabei, had output value of 3.54 billion yuan (about US$428 million) in 1998, which is about 2.5% of the prescription drug sales of Merck. 41 The entire Chinese pharmaceuticals industry produced 163 billion yuan (about US$19.69 billion) of drugs and healthcare products in 1998, which is about US$9 billion smaller than the US$28 billion recorded in Glaxo-SmithKline. 42 In fact, the production value of the whole Chinese pharmaceuticals industry is not much higher than the US$17 billion of prescription drug sales of Merck. 43 sales recorded by the top 10 global giants in 1997 (Table 3) The Pharmaceuticals Department is also planning to reduce the number of wholesales outlets dramatically to between 45 and 50 over the next five years through M&As. 46 43 Financial Times, (4 November 1999), p. 32. 44 The poor capability of quality control is especially pronounced among the army of small-scale pharmaceutical firms scattered all over China. 45 South China Morning Post, (3 August 2000) . 46 South China Morning Post, (11 July 2000 , 3 August 2000 , 8 September 2000 and 27 November 2001 .
Although the global giants may still only account for 25% of the Chinese drug market, their rate of market penetration is rising rapidly. If the market share of foreign-financed JVs is included, it is estimated that the global giants account for about one-third of the Chinese drug markets. 47 The market of Chinese herbal drugs is basically monopolised by the locally-funded firms. This pattern is expected to be continued, at least in the short to medium-terms. China has a long history of experience in classifying and 'testing' traditional medicines. Unlike Western patented medicines, the development of the bulk of these products were attributable mainly to the knowledge accumulated over centuries by unknown practitioners of traditional Chinese medicine, and cannot be patented under either Chinese or international law. By 1997, there were 1,013 enterprises producing traditional medicines, compared to 1,544 producing Western medicines. 50 The two sectors have very different economic characteristics. The unit value of Western medicines was far higher than for Chinese medicines. In 1997, Western medicines accounted for 68% of the pharmaceuticals industry's fixed assets, 63% of the sector's total sales value and 47% of it's total profits (Table 2) . Despite the absence of patents for most products, many of the most successful Chinese medicines are able to command premium prices. In 1997, Chinese traditional medicine enterprises accounted for only 18% of the sector's fixed assets and 22% of the sector's sales value, but they accounted for 30-38% of the sector's value-added and net profits.
Moreover, Chinese medicines achieved a ratio of profits to sales of 10.57% traditional Chinese medicine producers achieved a ratio of profits to sales of 17.16%, and a ratio of profits to fixed assets of 45.25%. Partly due to the lower required investment in R&D, Chinese medicine manufacturers are able to earn profits even though they operate at a smaller scale than chemical pharmaceuticals manufacturers. For instance, Chinese medicine firms with gross output value of 10-30 million yuan are profitable, while chemical pharmaceuticals firms are only profitable with gross output value of 30-50 million yuan.
With the Goliath (global giants) growing day-by-day, while David (the Chinese firms) remains under-nurtured, it is likely that the gap of R&D and production capabilities on chemical drugs between them will only be increased. The fact is that David is chasing a moving rather than a static target! The Chinese herbal drug is probably the only category in which the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry has potential international competitive advantages in the short-to medium-term.
Development
Strategies for the Chinese
Pharmaceuticals Industry
From above, it is obviously that the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry is unable to compete head-on with the global giants on Western drugs. Given the competitive advantages of the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry on Chinese drugs, three short and long-term development strategies are suggested: (1) consolidate the local market of herbal and generic drugs, (2) market Chinese drugs via the Internet, and (3) outsource R&D and collaborative marketing.
Consolidate the local market of herbal & generic drugs
The sales value of western drugs has grown by 10-12% per annum since 1997 and the value of the Chinese pharmaceuticals market is expected to exceed US$10 billion in 2000. 51 The Chinese market is still much smaller than the US$46 billion recorded in Japan and US$89 billion recorded in the US, but it is as big as 50 'reverse-chemical-engineering' and/or the transfer of know-how via JVs with Chinese firms. 55 Once the global giants establish their manufacturing and distribution networks, it is not inconceivable that they can 'beat the Chinese pharmaceutical firms at their own games'! Therefore, it is plausible that the first priority of the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry is to consolidate the domestic market of herbal and generic drugs, before the 'reverse-engineering' by the Western giants, rather than by trying to conquer the global market prematurely. 56
Getting the priority wrong, as with the exiting 'to conquer the world' strategy, the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry may ended up losing both of the domestic and international markets of herbal and chemical drugs.
Market alternative remedies via IT
The argument on consolidation of local market does not imply that the The market potential of on-line healthcare provider is increasingly realised by analysts. However, a number of big pharmaceutical websites are not well developed, providing only static or even out of date information, e.g.
www.bayer.com contains information on a suspected trial for lung cancer. 60
Therefore, there is still a virgin market on the internet to be conquered by Chinese pharmaceuticals industry.
Sub-contracting of R&D & collaborative marketing
To be approved by the regulatory authority, every new drug must undergo China Morning Post, (2 August 2000) . 59 The lack of authoritative and self-monitoring organisation on alternative remedies is one of the biggest obstacles to gain acceptance in the Western societies, e.g. almost no medical insurance company in the West recognises the benefits of alternative remedies and allows their policyholders to claim consultation fees. Chinese pharmaceutical firms can also consider being engaged in collaborative marketing with the global giants in the future, especially on globally marketable products. Through demonstration effects, Chinese pharmaceutical firms can learn the direct-to-customers (or consumer-oriented) marketing skills and the profit-sharing-based collaborative marketing scheme can be considered as the 'tuition fees' levied by the global giants. Therefore, the possibilities of such an arrangement should not be ruled out in the medium-to long-term.
Conclusions
With limited capabilities on R&D and global distribution channels as well as the virtual non-existence of patented drugs, the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry has little chance of entering the global market of Western prescription drugs and to compete with the established global giants head-on. The reality is that they are chasing a moving target and their competitors are becoming bigger and stronger every day. The substantial reduction of import tariffs and the granting of comprehensive trading and distribution rights to foreign-financed firms by 2003 effectively tilted the level-playing field against the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry, as the global giants can penetrate the Chinese market with all their available weapons, ranging from direct importation, manufacturing and distributing locally or through their exclusive global sourcing, marketing and distributing channels. Equipped with much deeper pockets and backed-up by much stronger R&D capabilities and product pipelines, it is only a matter of time before the global giants can overwhelm the Chinese pharmaceuticals market, provided that the SDA and the industry maintain their 'to conquer the world' strategy.
The grim reality is that there is not a single Chinese pharmaceutical firm with a R&D budget remotely capable of rival their Japanese counterparts, whose R&D budgets are already much lower than their Western counterparts. In fact, Japan has several pharmaceutical firms who are successfully manufacturing and marketing medicines with herbal ingredients, e.g. Takeda. Given the fact that the Japanese pharmaceutical firms already have a certain degree of knowledge on the usage of herbal medicines and equipped with a much stronger R&D team and marketing personnel, it is argued that they (rather than the global giants) are the major competitors to Chinese pharmaceutical firms (even in the Chinese market). This is because the Chinese pharmaceutical firms have virtually no chance of overtaking the global giants in the near future, yet it is more realistic to regard the Japanese pharmaceutical firms as their competitive targets. 
